There Goes the Neighborhood: The Bush-Ashcroft Plan to by Gene Healy
The centerpiece of President Bush’s crime-
fighting program is an initiative called Project
Safe Neighborhoods. That initiative calls for the
hiring of some 700 lawyers who will be dedicated
to prosecuting firearm offenses, such as the
unlawful possession of a gun by a drug user or a
convicted felon. The basic idea is to divert
firearm offenses from state court, where they
would ordinarily be prosecuted, to federal court,
where tougher prison sentences will be meted
out. Project Safe Neighborhoods will also pro-
vide funding to escalate gun prosecutions at the
state level.
Praise for Project Safe Neighborhoods comes
from quarters as diverse as Handgun Control,
Inc. and the National Rifle Association.
Unfortunately, those disparate parties have unit-
ed in support of a singularly bad idea. Project
Safe Neighborhoods is an affront to the consti-
tutional principle of federalism. The initiative
flouts the Tenth Amendment by relying on fed-
eral statutes that have no genuine constitutional
basis. Moreover, the program will very likely lead
to overenforcement of gun laws and open the
door to prosecutorial mischief affecting the
racial composition of juries. As the constitution-
al and policy implications of Project Safe
Neighborhoods become more apparent, the
Bush initiative looks less like a commonsense
solution to crime and more like a political gim-
mick with pernicious unintended consequences.
If the “respect for federalism” he has repeatedly
professed is sincere, President Bush must recon-
sider his support for Project Safe Neighborhoods.
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Introduction
The centerpiece of President Bush’s
crime-fighting program is an initiative called
Project Safe Neighborhoods, which calls for
escalating enforcement of gun control laws.
Under the program, for which funds have
been appropriated in the fiscal year 2002
budget, firearm offenses that would ordinar-
ily be prosecuted in state court—such as pos-
session of a handgun by a felon or a drug
user—will now be diverted to the federal
court system, where mandatory minimum
sentences, tougher bond requirements, and
the fact that convicts often serve their time
out of state are said to provide a harsher
deterrent. Project Safe Neighborhoods will
cost taxpayers more than $550 million over a
two-year period by, among other things, hir-
ing more than 700 new lawyers to serve as
full-time gun offense prosecutors. According
to President Bush, the message of Project
Safe Neighborhoods is, “If you use a gun ille-
gally, you will do hard time.”1
Project Safe Neighborhoods has its roots
in Project Exile, an initiative begun in 1997
by federal prosecutors in Richmond,
Virginia, and subsequently embraced by vari-
ous other jurisdictions. Praise of the Project
Exile program, which, like Project Safe
Neighborhoods, involves diverting state-level
gun prosecutions to federal court, has come
from diverse quarters. People who are nor-
mally at odds with one another over gun con-
trol—such as Sarah Brady and Charlton
Heston and Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.)
and Attorney General John Ashcroft—have
lauded Exile for its supposedly tough-mind-
ed approach to crime.2
Agreement among people of disparate
viewpoints might be taken to indicate the
reasonableness of the Bush initiative, but a
closer look at Safe Neighborhoods and Exile
reveals that such programs are an affront to
the constitutional principle of federalism.
Moreover, such initiatives will likely lead to
overenforcement of gun laws and allow pros-
ecutors to select their preferred forum—fed-
eral or state—on the basis of the racial com-
position of the respective jury pools. As the
constitutional and policy implications of
Project Safe Neighborhoods and Project
Exile emerge, the Bush initiative looks less
like a commonsense solution to crime and
more like a political gimmick with perni-
cious unintended consequences.
The Genesis of Project Safe
Neighborhoods
In the late 1990s conventional wisdom
held that the movement for gun control was
in its ascendancy. Columbine and other
school shootings gave rise to new gun con-
trol proposals and the Million Mom March—
an organization that many commentators
saw as a potential rival to the National Rifle
Association’s political strength. Confronted
with what they perceived to be a groundswell
of anti-gun sentiment, supporters of gun
rights faced a dilemma: how to address the
problem of criminal incidents involving guns
without giving in to the demand for new gun
control laws. The NRA and the Republican
Party thought they had hit on the answer
with Project Exile, a gun prosecution initia-
tive that originated in the office of the U.S.
attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia.
On the eve of the Million Mom March,
then–Republican national chairman Jim
Nicholson issued a statement saying,
“Republicans share the concerns of the many
marchers who will come to our nation’s cap-
ital to call for an end to gun violence” and
offered a nationwide expansion of the Project
Exile program as an alternative.3
Exile on Main Street
Project Exile, the prototype for President
Bush’s Project Safe Neighborhoods, began in
Richmond in 1997, when an ambitious feder-
al prosecutor, David Schiller, started aggres-
sively prosecuting handgun offenses that
would normally have been handled in state
courts. At that time, Richmond suffered dis-
proportionately from violent crime, routinely
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landing a spot among the 10 cities with the
highest per capita murder rates.4 Schiller took
it upon himself to try to reduce that rating. As
Schiller described his strategy, under Project
Exile, “all felons with guns, guns/drug cases
and gun/domestic violence cases in
Richmond are federally prosecuted, without
regard to numbers or quantities.”5 The bill-
boards advertising the program along
Interstate 95 put it concisely: “An Illegal Gun
Gets You Five Years in Federal Prison.”
Helen Fahey, then–U.S. attorney for the
Eastern District of Virginia and Schiller’s
boss, describes Exile as being “named for the
idea that if the police catch a criminal in
Richmond with a gun, the criminal has for-
feited his right to remain in the community.
. . . [He] will be ‘exiled’ to federal prison.”6
From Fahey and Schiller’s perspective, there
were several distinct advantages to bringing
firearm cases in federal court. First, federal
bond statutes would allow the majority of
offenders to be held without bail. Second,
offenders prosecuted in federal court would
be subject to mandatory minimum sentences
under federal law, resulting in stiff penalties.
Finally, according to Fahey: “Defendants
know that a federal jail term will likely be
served elsewhere in the country. This has a
major impact because serving a jail sentence
among friends . . . is seen by defendants as
much less onerous than serving time in a
prison out of state.”7
To further their goal of getting guns off
Richmond’s streets, Schiller and Fahey helped
assemble a coalition of business and commu-
nity leaders that eventually became the Project
Exile Citizen Support Foundation. That foun-
dation raised money for radio ads, billboard
space, and a city bus painted black and bearing
the warning that illegal possession of a gun
brings with it a five-year term in federal
prison.8 The NRA contributed $125,000 to
Richmond’s advertising programs.9
Exile featured extensive cooperation
between local and federal officials. Each
Richmond police officer was given a 24-hour
pager number for an on-call agent from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
and cue cards listing federal gun possession
crimes.10 Richmond police were directed to
pursue suspects for, among other offenses,
carrying a weapon while possessing drugs,
being a convicted felon in possession of a
weapon, and being an illegal alien in posses-
sion of a weapon—all federal crimes.11
By March 1999, two years after Exile’s
inception, 512 guns had been seized, and fed-
eral prosecutors had secured 438 indict-
ments and 302 convictions with an average
sentence of more than 53 months.12 Other
federal prosecutors followed Schiller and
Fahey’s lead; the program was expanded to
the Norfolk and Tidewater areas of Virginia
as well as Rochester, New York. Philadelphia,
Oakland, Birmingham, and Baton Rouge are
also implementing their own versions of
Project Exile.13
Congressional Republicans took notice of
Exile and praised its hard-line approach to the
enforcement of existing gun laws. In April
2000 the House of Representatives passed
Rep. Bill McCollum’s (R-Fla.) Project Exile Act,
which would have provided $100 million in
federal funds for Exile programs across the
country.14 Presidential candidate George W.
Bush touted Exile on the campaign trail and
called for nationwide expansion of the pro-
gram along the lines proposed by the House.15
The Bush-Ashcroft Program
Making good on his campaign promise, in
May 2001 President Bush unveiled his anti-
crime initiative, Project Safe Neighborhoods,
which uses Project Exile as its model. The pro-
gram would “take Exile national,” bringing to
cities all across America what David Schiller
brought to Richmond. Safe Neighborhoods’
centerpiece is a plan to hire a host of new fed-
eral prosecutors, dedicated to bringing federal
gun charges for offenses that would normally
be handled in state courts. The Bush proposal
would fund 113 new assistant U.S. attorneys
to serve as full-time gun prosecutors.16
Safe Neighborhoods also aims to promote
gun prosecutions at the state and local level. In
addition to the funds for new federal prosecu-
tors, the president’s proposal dedicates $75
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million to hiring and training full-time state
and local prosecutors. That money is expected
to fund around 600 new gun prosecutors.17
Other funding will be available through
Project Safe Neighborhoods to “coordinate all
gun-related programs,” including community
outreach programs, but Safe Neighborhoods’
central goal is to raise the number of firearm
offense prosecutions in America. As the presi-
dent put it in his remarks announcing the pro-
gram, “This Nation must enforce the gun laws
which exist on the books.”18
Constitutional Federalism
and Crime
President Bush’s concern with violent
crime is understandable, and his desire to
tackle the problem without adding to the
gun laws already on the books is laudable.
But as Bush himself would acknowledge,
good intentions are not enough; reformers
must operate within the bounds of our
Constitution—a charter that divides powers
and responsibilities between the federal and
the state governments.
Speaking before the National Governors
Association soon after his inauguration,
President Bush declared: 
I’m going to make respect for federal-
ism a priority in this administration.
Respect for federalism begins with an
understanding of its philosophy. The
framers of the Constitution did not
believe in an all-knowing, all-power-
ful federal government. They believed
that our freedom is best preserved
when power is dispersed. That is why
they limited and enumerated the fed-
eral government’s powers and
reserved the remaining functions of
government to the states.19
Is Project Safe Neighborhoods, the center-
piece of the president’s anti-crime program,
consistent with the “respect for federalism”
that President Bush professes? To answer that
question, it is necessary to review the consti-
tutional framework for federal criminal law.
The Original Design
As President Bush recognized in his
remarks to the governors, the Constitution’s
enumeration of the federal government’s pow-
ers was meant to limit the reach of the federal
government. The only powers the federal gov-
ernment possesses are those that have been
delegated to it by the people and enumerated
in the Constitution. All other powers are, as
the Tenth Amendment confirms, “reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people.” 
The Constitution provides the federal
government with an exceedingly slender
grant of authority over criminal law. There
are three specifically enumerated federal
crimes—counterfeiting, piracy, and treason—
and two general founts of federal criminal
authority—Congress’s power to punish
“offenses against the law of nations” and its
power to “make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers.” 
The records of the Constitutional
Convention indicate that the federal role in
criminal law was limited by design. At the
Philadelphia Convention, discussion of crim-
inal law issues focused almost exclusively on
treason, piracy, counterfeiting, and offenses
against the law of nations.20 Federal criminal
authority, like federal authority in general,
was to be directed in the main toward affairs
of state and international relations, as well as
protecting the federal government and its
interests. As James Madison noted in
Federalist Paper no. 45: 
The powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State gov-
ernments are numerous and indefi-
nite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, such
as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce. . . . The powers reserved to
the several states will extend to all
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objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.21
Alexander Hamilton agreed that criminal
laws were the province of the states and
argued that this would help the states main-
tain the affections of the citizenry and resist
encroachments by the federal government:
There is one transcendent advantage
belonging to the province of the
State governments which alone suf-
fices to place the matter in a clear
and satisfactory light. I mean the
ordinary administration of criminal
and civil justice.22
Early federal practice hewed closely to that
understanding. The first Congress enacted
the Crimes Act of 1790, which established 17
federal criminal offenses. For the most part,
the Crimes Act was directed at ends unques-
tionably federal in nature—interference with
the federal government and its operations.
For example, the act proscribed perjury in
federal court, theft of government property,
revenue fraud, treason, and bribery of federal
officials. Except in areas where the federal
government had exclusive jurisdiction, as in
the District of Columbia, federal territories,
and military bases, early federal criminal law
did not reach crimes against individuals,
such as murder and ordinary theft.23
The Creeping Expansion of Federal
Criminal Law
In the post–Civil War era, Congress began
to expand into areas traditionally within the
ambit of the states’ police powers. In response
to both state and private violence against the
freedmen in the South, Congress enacted a
number of civil rights statutes that provided
for federal prosecution of certain violations of
the freedmen’s rights.24 In addition, the
increasing integration of the national econo-
my during the late 19th century provided fur-
ther impetus for the federalization of crime, in
the form of the first mail fraud statute (1872),
the criminal provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission Act (1887), and the
Sherman Antitrust Act (1890).
The federal war on alcohol, which began
in 1919, also greatly increased the number of
federal prosecutions. Despite the fact that
Prohibition was repealed in 1933, federaliza-
tion of crime continued to increase, thanks
in large part to an increasing number of reg-
ulatory crimes and a newly expansive inter-
pretation of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce, sanctioned by the
Supreme Court.25
But the real surge in the federalization of
crime has come over the last 30 years, as
Congress has ramped up the drug war and
increasingly involved itself in the punish-
ment of intrastate acts of violence. According
to a report published by the American Bar
Association, more than 40 percent of the fed-
eral criminal provisions enacted since the
Civil War have been enacted since 1970.26 By
the early 1990s, there were more than 3,000
federal crimes on the books.27 Whereas once
federal criminal statutes focused principally
on crimes affecting federal interests, today
most such statutes proscribe conduct that is
already covered by state criminal law. In
1997, for example, 95 percent of federal pros-
ecutions involved federal statutes that dupli-
cate state criminal statutes.28 Thus, Congress
has seen fit to proscribe offenses such as car
theft, drive-by shootings, burning a church,
and even disrupting a rodeo.29 Congress’s
penchant for involving itself in matters as
mundane and local as those was merely one
indication that in the post–New Deal era the
federal government had slipped its constitu-
tional moorings.
Project Safe
Neighborhoods: A Frontal
Assault on Federalism
When the Republican Party won historic
majorities in the Senate and House in
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November 1994, there was good reason to
expect that the trend toward overweening fed-
eralization had crested and that the distinc-
tion between what was properly federal and
what was properly local would once again be
respected. Republican candidates for the
House in that election tried to take advantage
of a burgeoning Tenth Amendment move-
ment in the country, and their Contract with
America included a pledge to end unfunded
mandates on states and localities.30 As
then–senate majority leader Robert Dole (R-
Kans.) put it in his first speech to the 104th
Congress, “If I have one goal for the 104th
Congress, it is this: that we will dust off the
10th Amendment. . . . Our guide will be this
question: Is this program a basic function of a
limited government?”31 To stress the point,
Dole took to carrying a copy of the Tenth
Amendment in his coat pocket and taking it
out during speeches. 
And indeed there were significant victories
for the Tenth Amendment during the period
of Republican ascendancy. Not least among
them was the advent of a Supreme Court
jurisprudence that started to take federalism
seriously. Perhaps emboldened by the politi-
cal trends sweeping the country, the Court in
1995 issued a landmark ruling in United States
v. Lopez that made clear that the long-dor-
mant doctrine of enumerated powers had not
lost its vitality.32 In Lopez, the Court struck
down as unconstitutional the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, which criminalized gun
possession “at a place the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.” According to the Court, to allow
Congress to invoke the Commerce Power to
regulate a matter so quintessentially local and
noncommercial would “bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the states.”33 When Lopez was fol-
lowed by Printz v. U.S.,34 prohibiting Congress
from “commandeering” state and local police
officers into enforcing the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act, and U.S. v. Morrison,35
striking down the civil suit provisions of the
Violence against Women Act as improperly
directed toward intrastate crime and beyond
the scope of the Commerce Power, it became
clear that a historic opportunity to restore
federalism was at hand.
Still, a true restoration of the proper rela-
tionship between the states and the federal
government would have to wait until
Republicans took the White House—or so
supporters of the Tenth Amendment were
told. And in January 2001 the heralded event
came to pass. Long-suffering constitutional-
ists finally saw the day when a president who
had named Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas as his favorite justices and had
pledged himself to “make respect for federal-
ism a priority” in his administration
assumed office. 
Yet any rejoicing on the part of constitu-
tionalists would be premature, to say the
least. In several important areas of domestic
policy, President Bush’s initiatives suggest
that, where it counts, political expediency
will trump respect for federalism. For
instance, it is hard to think of an issue more
undeniably local in nature than education.
And yet the president’s education initiative,
signed on January 8, 2002, dramatically
increases federal spending on education and
mandates state testing of pupils in reading
and math.36 With Project Safe
Neighborhoods, respect for the Tenth
Amendment has once again yielded to politi-
cal calculation.
The political calculation of many sup-
porters of Exile and Safe Neighborhoods is
that an aggressive effort to “enforce the gun
laws on the books” can forestall the gun con-
trol lobby’s efforts to enact still more gun
laws. Unfortunately, in attempting to pre-
serve Second Amendment rights, supporters
of Exile and Safe Neighborhoods are con-
ducting a frontal assault on the constitution-
al principle of federalism.
Bush and Rehnquist Court at Cross-
Purposes
The Supreme Court has noted that the
division of power between the states and the
federal governments is 
6
In attempting to
preserve Second
Amendment
rights, supporters
of Exile and Safe
Neighborhoods
are conducting a
frontal assault on
the constitutional
principle of 
federalism.
one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty. “Just as the sepa-
ration and independence of the coor-
dinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accu-
mulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front.”
To quote Madison, . . . “a double secu-
rity arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself.”37
To prevent an excessive accumulation of
federal power, the Framers refused to grant
plenary police power to the federal govern-
ment; instead, the Constitution grants
Congress authority, pursuant to various enu-
merated powers, to fashion criminal statutes
to protect distinctly federal interests. General
law enforcement authority—“the ordinary
administration of criminal justice,” in
Hamilton’s phrase—is reserved to the states.
With Lopez, Printz, Morrison, and other cases,
the Rehnquist Court has begun to slowly
shift the balance and restore American crim-
inal law to the original understanding.
Exile and Safe Neighborhoods, in con-
trast, proceed on the assumption that the
federal government has general police pow-
ers. By employing federal gun possession
statutes that rest on a dubious reading of the
power to “regulate commerce . . . among the
several states,” those programs threaten to
make the ordinary administration of crimi-
nal justice a federal responsibility. More than
one federal court has recognized the dangers
inherent in such initiatives. In United States v.
Jones (1999), a federal appeals court called
Project Exile “a substantial federal incursion
into a sovereign state’s area of authority and
responsibility.”38 District Judge Robert E.
Payne struck a similar note in United States v.
Nathan (1998): “The federal government has
embarked upon a major incursion into the
sovereignty of Virginia.” According to Judge
Payne, the “risk of attenuating the Tenth
Amendment” is present even in Project Exile
in its current (voluntary) form. Moreover,
“carried to its logical extreme [the argument
for Exile] would make federal officers respon-
sible for prosecuting all serious crimes in fed-
eral courts. Were that the case, we soon
would have a federal police force with the
attendant risk of the loss of liberty which
that presents.”39
Indeed, the Bush administration, with its
embrace of the Exile model, seems bent on
obliterating the distinction between what is
properly local and what is properly national.
One of the initiatives under the Project Safe
Neighborhoods umbrella is Project Sentry,
which Attorney General Ashcroft describes as
“a vital federal-state project dedicated to
prosecuting gun crimes committed at our
nation’s schools and dedicated to protecting
juveniles from gun crime.”40 Under Project
Sentry, the Justice Department will provide
every U.S. Attorney’s Office with a new pros-
ecutor to combat “school-related gun vio-
lence.”41 A more brazen affront to the
Rehnquist Court’s landmark ruling in
Lopez—striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act—could hardly be imagined. In that
case, Congress’s attempt to make a federal
crime out of gun possession in the vicinity of
a school was held to be beyond the limited
powers delegated to the federal government.
The Court noted that, under the govern-
ment’s theory of the case, “it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforce-
ment or education where States historically
have been sovereign.”42 Needless to say, the
actions of President Bush do not match his
statements with respect to federalism.
Clogging the Courts
Disregarding our constitutional structure,
as Exile and Safe Neighborhoods do, brings
with it a host of troubling consequences.43 In
1998 the American Bar Association’s Task
Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law
examined the grave problems caused by
promiscuous federalization of crime. Many of
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the concerns the task force addressed are
inherent in Project Exile and the president’s
Project Safe Neighborhoods. Among those
concerns are “the centralization of criminal
law enforcement power in the federal govern-
ment,” the threat of “disparate results for the
same conduct,” “diminution of a principled
basis for selecting a case as a federal or local
crime,” and “increased power at the federal
prosecutorial level,” leading to less local con-
trol of prosecutors.44
But perhaps the most immediate danger
lies in Project Safe Neighborhoods’ “adverse
impact on the federal judicial system.”45
Simply put, the federal government’s prima-
ry responsibility is to provide a legal forum in
which citizens with valid federal claims can
promptly and dependably vindicate their
rights. Project Safe Neighborhoods’ federal-
ization of crime will distract the federal
courts by greatly exacerbating the strain on
the federal court system—a phenomenon
that Chief Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly
decried.46 Mindful of Rehnquist’s warnings,
Judge Richard L. Williams, chief judge of the
U.S. District Court in Richmond, com-
plained in a letter to the chief justice that
Project Exile has “transformed [our court]
into a minor-grade police court,” reducing
the amount of time judges can spend on
matters that are properly federal.47
Judge Williams is right to worry; federal
criminal cases do appear to be crowding out
complex civil matters. Despite a growing
absolute number of civil cases on the federal
docket, the number of civil trials has
decreased to make way for a growing number
of federal criminal cases, often involving run-
of-the-mill crimes traditionally handled by
the states. Although many of the federal
criminal cases involve ordinary street crimes,
they consume a disproportionate amount of
judicial resources, in part because of federal
sentencing procedures.48
Judge Fred Motz, chief judge of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland in
Baltimore, says that Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods could be “devastating” to the federal
court system. Given that many gun arrests
involve drawn-out evidence suppression hear-
ings, according to Judge Motz, “If these [gun
possession] cases flood the federal courts,
then it is going to have a tremendous impact.”
Although the effect is “unseen,” the diversion
of federal resources will adversely affect the
rights of civil litigants seeking redress in feder-
al court. In concrete terms, it means that, if
someone files a lawsuit seeking redress, that
case will not be resolved by a court for years. As
Louisiana State University law professor John
S. Baker noted, if Safe Neighborhoods is
implemented, then “in some places, if you
have a civil case, forget it. It’s not going any-
where.”49 Thus, the Bush-Ashcroft program is
a perfect illustration of an unintended conse-
quence noted by the Nobel laureate economist
Milton Friedman, among others—that when
government begins to do what it should not, it
ceases to do what it should. 
Interfering with State Law Enforcement
Safe Neighborhoods’ assault on federalism
goes beyond simply increasing the number of
federal gun prosecutions; its plan to provide
funding for state and local prosecutors should
also be deeply troubling to people who under-
stand that with federal money come federal
“strings.” As noted above, the Bush plan
includes $75 million for a program that would
hire about 600 state and local prosecutors; the
funding would be conditioned on those pros-
ecutors pursuing gun law violations full-time.
That is a dangerous precedent—one that
strikes at the very notion of separate spheres of
authority for the state and federal govern-
ments. By employing the spending power,
Congress can direct the administration of
state-level criminal justice in areas where there
is absolutely no federal interest. In so doing,
Congress can circumvent constitutional limits
on its enumerated powers.50 Indeed, using the
tactic approved by the Bush administration in
Project Safe Neighborhoods, the federal gov-
ernment could dictate increased prosecution
of virtually any crime within the ambit of the
states’ police powers. As federal funding
increases relative to state law enforcement
budgets, the danger of creeping federal influ-
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ence over state priorities will likely increase.
Do the Republican conservatives who sup-
port Project Safe Neighborhoods really want
that program to become the model for feder-
al anti-crime initiatives in the future? If it
does, it is difficult to see any stopping point
to the politicization of federal crime policy.
The program stands as an open invitation for
special interest groups to push their own
“prosecution-stimulus” initiatives. Take hate
crimes, for example. Why should left-leaning
pressure groups stop with the passage of a
federal hate crimes act? Following the Safe
Neighborhoods model, they can push for sev-
eral hundred new federal and state prosecu-
tors dedicated to bringing hate crime indict-
ments. Feminists will doubtless push for
more prosecutors for sexual assault offens-
es.51 Nor is there anything to stop advocates
of child welfare from promoting the funding
of several hundred full-time state-level child
abuse prosecutors. In the past, conservatives
have expressed valid concerns about whether
overzealous prosecutors have been swept up
in the emotional nature of the child abuse
issue and ended up incarcerating innocent
people; federal subsidization of such prosecu-
tions would increase that risk exponentially.52
The Republicans who supported Exile
and Safe Neighborhoods as a means of fore-
stalling new gun control legislation have
been too clever by half. The principle that
they have endorsed not only runs roughshod
over the idea that the states ought to be able
to set their own prosecutorial priorities, it
fairly begs for those priorities to be set by the
most vocal and powerful interest groups in
Washington. If the “respect for federalism”
he has repeatedly professed is genuine,
President Bush must reconsider his support
for Project Safe Neighborhoods.53
The Closer One Looks,
The More Problems
One Sees
Federalism issues to one side, it is easy to
understand the superficial appeal of Project
Safe Neighborhoods. The program has the
merit of relying on existing laws, rather than
calling for new ones; moreover, the laws it
relies on are targeted at offenders unlikely to
get much sympathy from the general public:
felons and drug users with guns, in large part.
But as with many anti-crime initiatives com-
ing out of Washington, a closer look at the
program raises questions. What kinds of cases
are Safe Neighborhoods prosecutors likely to
bring? What opportunities for prosecutorial
mischief might be presented by the program?
Assembly-Line Justice
Unlike an ordinary prosecutor, whose
bailiwick covers the gamut of criminal law, a
Safe Neighborhoods prosecutor is limited to
only one category of criminal charges.
Whereas other prosecutors are able to shift
their focus to other categories of crime once
they have charged the most dangerous and
deserving defendants in a given category of
offense, Safe Neighborhoods prosecutors will
be expected to continue prosecuting viola-
tions of gun laws. Their incentive will be to
keep focusing on the numbers—to continue
producing indictments and convictions
regardless of merit. That incentive threatens
to result in assembly-line justice and overen-
forcement. The incentive structure that Safe
Neighborhoods sets up will lead to the prolif-
eration of “garbage” gun charges—technical
violations of firearms statutes on which no
sensible prosecutor would expend his ener-
gy.54 Worse, Safe Neighborhoods will likely
result in federal and state governments’ lock-
ing up firearms owners who do not deserve to
be in jail.
Federal prosecutors already operate under
an incentive structure that forces them to
focus on the statistical “bottom line.”
Statistics on arrests and convictions are the
Justice Department’s bread and butter. They
are submitted to the department’s outside
auditors, are instrumental in assessing the
“performance” of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices,
and are the focus of the department’s annual
report. As George Washington University Law
School professor Jonathan Turley puts it, “In
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some ways, the Justice Department continues
to operate under the body count approach in
Vietnam. . . . They feel a need to produce a
body count to Congress to justify past appro-
priations and secure future increases.”55
When this focus on charging and convic-
tion rates is combined with Safe
Neighborhoods’ prosecutors’ inability to
bring charges under other statutes, overen-
forcement will be the very likely result.
Simply put, not every technical violation of
federal or state gun statutes deserves to be
prosecuted, particularly where, as is the case
on the federal level, convictions will lead to
mandatory minimum sentences and sub-
stantial jail time. But a Safe Neighborhoods
prosecutor likely will not have the luxury of
eschewing trivial cases.
And the federal criminal code contains a
number of trivial gun offenses that will be
useful to any Safe Neighborhoods prosecu-
tor who is anxious to keep his or her num-
bers up. Should the full power of the federal
government really be directed at a defendant
who has sold a gun to someone he may have
reason to believe is an unlawful user of con-
trolled substances or has been discharged
from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions?56 Moreover, as at least one feder-
al court has noted, the provision of the feder-
al criminal code that prohibits gun posses-
sion by someone under a restraining order in
a domestic dispute allows a defendant to be
stripped of his Second Amendment rights
and imprisoned without even a factual find-
ing that he has ever threatened anyone with
violence.57 Indeed, it appears that Project
Exile already encourages skewed priorities on
the part of prosecutors. As federal Judge
Richard L. Williams commented on
Richmond’s Project Exile, “Ninety percent of
these [Exile] defendants are probably no dan-
ger to society.”58
The same could be said of the defendants
incarcerated under Colorado’s Project Exile.
Reporter David Holthouse examined every
Colorado Project Exile prosecution from the
program’s inception in September 1999
through January 2002. The vast bulk of
Colorado Exile defendants were prosecuted
under the “prohibited-person-in-possession”
statutes (i.e., felon, drug user, etc.). Of those
defendants, the overwhelming majority—154
of 191—had no violent felonies at all on their
records. Two of them were simply illegal
aliens without criminal records. Another—in
an item picked up by “News of the
Weird”–style columns nationwide—went to
jail for posing nude with a firearm.59
That defendant, a 33-year-old Colorado
Springs resident, was arrested when federal
authorities came into possession of seven
photos of Katica Crippen in various poses,
holding a firearm. Her prior drug convictions
made her a felon in possession under federal
law, and prosecutor James Allison brought
the full force of the federal government down
on her. 
Judge Richard Matsch, who presided over
the Oklahoma City bombing trial, was out-
raged by the poor prosecutorial judgment
and the waste of federal resources. “How far
is this policy of locking people up with guns
going to go?” Judge Matsch demanded. “I
want to know why this is a federal case. Who
decided this is a federal crime?”60
Fomenting Miscarriages of Justice
More disturbing still is the prospect that
Safe Neighborhoods will result in some
appalling miscarriages of justice. Consider
some of the cases that have been prosecuted
in the pre–Project Safe Neighborhoods world.
In April 1999 Brian I. Ford went into a
Fairfax City pawnshop to hock a Civil
War–era rifle for $35. A few weeks later,
thanks to a police background check, Ford
was arrested for being a felon in possession of
a firearm, because of prior convictions for
burglary and robbery. Had the case gone to
federal court, Ford would have faced exten-
sive jail time. But because Fairfax did not
have a federal Project Exile program, and
because Virginia’s state-level Exile program
had not yet been implemented, the jury was
free to recommend only a $1,250 fine and no
jail time.61
Michael Mahoney wasn’t quite so lucky.
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Mahoney, a Tennessee businessman, is cur-
rently serving a 15-year term in federal prison
as the result of a minor handgun offense. As
the owner of the Hard Rack Pool Hall in
Jackson, Tennessee, Mahoney had to make
nightly cash deposits at his local bank. He
carried a .22-caliber Derringer for personal
protection while he did so. When Mahoney’s
pistol was stolen in 1992, he bought another
one at a pawnshop, filling out the back-
ground-check form required by federal law.
The problem for Mahoney was that 13 years
earlier he had been convicted of selling drugs
to an undercover police officer three times
during the course of a three-week investiga-
tion. After the conviction, for which he
served 22 months in prison, Mahoney
cleaned up his act and became a law-abiding
citizen. In 1991 he underwent an extensive
background check to get a liquor license;
because he had stayed out of trouble for
more than 10 years, the license was granted.
Mahoney, wrongly assuming that his lone
felony conviction had been wiped out com-
pletely, marked down that he was not a felon
on the federal background-check form for
gun purchases. A BATF investigation result-
ed in Mahoney’s indictment as a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm as a result of
buying the Derringer in 1991. Under federal
mandatory minimum sentencing rules,
Mahoney’s three drug sales during the 1980
investigation were treated as three separate
offenses, making Mahoney a “career crimi-
nal” and earning him a minimum sentence
of 180 months. Though U.S. District Judge
James D. Todd protested that Mahoney’s was
“not the kind of case that Congress had in
mind,” his hands were tied by federal law, and
he had no choice but to put Mahoney in a jail
cell for 15 years.62
Safe Neighborhoods promises to put
more than 700 full-time gun prosecutors
(600 state, 113 federal) to work. Add to that
the fact that a job as a full-time gun prosecu-
tor is likely to appeal disproportionately to
attorneys with an ideological hostility toward
gun ownership and one has the makings of a
nationwide “zero tolerance” policy for tech-
nical infractions of gun laws. As the program
is implemented, one can expect more miscar-
riages of justice.63
Threatening the Right to Trial by Jury 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defen-
dants in “all criminal prosecutions” the right
to a public trial “by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.” The Supreme Court
has held that the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection found in the Fourteenth
Amendment and (implicitly) in the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause further
protects a federal defendant’s right to a jury
trial by curtailing prosecutorial decisions
that affect the racial composition of juries.64
Nonetheless, in some cases, federal prosecu-
tors have deliberately used Project Exile to
secure a jury with a different racial composi-
tion than would otherwise be available at the
state level. Project Safe Neighborhoods’ mis-
sion to take Exile nationwide will only exac-
erbate that unseemly tactic.
In Richmond, Virginia, where Project Exile
was first implemented, the jury pool for the
state-level circuit court is approximately 75
percent African-American. In contrast, the
jury pool for the Eastern District of Virginia,
from which federal criminal juries are drawn
in the Richmond area, is only about 10 per-
cent African-American. Those facts were not
lost on the federal prosecutors working on
Project Exile cases in Richmond. At a
Richmond Bench-Bar conference discussing
Project Exile, a federal prosecutor stated that
one of the program’s goals was avoiding
“Richmond juries.” Another prosecutor made
a similar admission at the sentencing hearing
in United States v. Scates, a Project Exile case.65
In the 1999 case of United States v. Jones, a
federal district court considered, and reject-
ed, a Project Exile defendant’s claim that
such statements of bias revealed a prosecuto-
rial design to affect the racial composition of
his jury and thus violated his right to equal
protection of the laws. While the court
expressed its “concern about the discretion
afforded individuals who divert cases from
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state to federal court for prosecution under
Project Exile,” it was unwilling to hold that
that discretion had been improperly exer-
cised in this case, or that Project Exile had
been systematically used to divert black
defendants into the federal system and away
from “Richmond juries.” According to the
court, the “desire to avoid Richmond juries”
could be given “a less nefarious construc-
tion”: “A ‘Richmond jury’ could simply be
one bound by the laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia.” The court
invoked “the presumption of regularity
afforded prosecutorial discretion” and
refused to interpret the statements of the fed-
eral prosecutors as discriminatory.66
However, the court was disturbed by the
lack of any discernible or judicially reviewable
standards governing when a case should be
assigned to federal rather than state court. It
noted that Exile’s design presented a real risk
of selective federalization on the basis of race: 
If the process of diverting cases for
federal prosecution is indeed inde-
pendently accomplished by one
unsupervised individual who is
aware of the defendants’ race, then
Project Exile unnecessarily invites a
substantial risk of selective prosecu-
tion. Indeed, if, as proponents of
Project Exile maintain, there are dis-
parities in the effectiveness of federal
and state prosecutions then those
disparities only increase the poten-
tial for discriminatory diversions for
federal prosecution.67
Those risks are multiplied by Safe
Neighborhoods’ extension of the Exile model
throughout all 50 states. Thus far, Safe
Neighborhoods does not appear to include
any standards to use in determining when it is
appropriate to bring gun charges in federal, as
opposed to state, court. That absence of stan-
dards for diverting cases to federal court, cou-
pled with the close cooperation between feder-
al and state officials that Safe Neighborhoods
envisions, creates a real risk that prosecutors
will divert cases that they perceive as racially
charged to the federal system. Such forum-
shopping tactics violate the guarantee of equal
protection and undermine the constitutional
right to a jury trial.
Are There Any Benefits?
Is It Worth It?
The problems associated with the Bush
administration’s attempt to nationalize
Project Exile under the auspices of Project
Safe Neighborhoods have been noted. But
what about the benefits? What do the
American people get in exchange for weaken-
ing our federal structure and undermining
our constitutional liberties? 
Not much, as it turns out. Exile has been
dramatically oversold by politicians and polit-
ical activists who see in it a means of warding
off restrictive gun control legislation. First of
all, the legal tools available to state prosecu-
tors pursuing armed felons are, in many cases,
essentially the same as those available to fed-
eral prosecutors. Second, there is very little
evidence that Exile has been the impetus for
any dramatic reduction in crime in any city
where it has been implemented.
In United States v. Jones, a panel of three fed-
eral judges examined Richmond’s experience
with Project Exile and concluded that Exile was
superfluous, given that “the Commonwealth
of Virginia possesses the same institutional
mechanisms necessary to combat the prob-
lems Project Exile abdicates to federal prosecu-
tors.”68 According to the court, the Virginia
state statutes governing handgun crime are
substantially similar to those at the federal
level. Moreover, given its tough “three strikes”
statute and its abolition of parole, Virginia law
in some cases provides for harsher penalties for
certain firearms offenses. Though rarely used
in Virginia, the statutory provisions allowing
the prosecutor to oppose pretrial release are
also “substantively identical” to those available
to federal prosecutors.69
In addition, the court found that Exile pris-
oners were not really “exiled” at all, despite
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U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey’s claim that the
prospect of serving time out of state was a
major deterrent for criminals. As the court
noted, “The vast majority of Project Exile
defendants are incarcerated at the Northern
Neck Regional Jail while awaiting trial and at
the Federal Correction Institute in Petersburg,
Virginia, following conviction.”70 Since the
Virginia state penitentiary system has facilities
located further away from Richmond than
either of those institutions, “Project Exile
actually results in incarceration in facilities
closer than many available in the state sys-
tem.” Accordingly, the court concluded that
“the location of incarceration provides no jus-
tification for Project Exile.”71
There is little evidence that Exile is the
miracle cure its proponents claim. The homi-
cide rate in Richmond fell 36 percent from
1997 to 1999, the period when Exile was
most aggressively enforced.72 But gun-related
homicides and other violent crime dropped
significantly all across the country during
the same period, and criminologists do not
agree about the cause of that decline.73 For
example, violent crime in New Orleans
dropped 18 percent between 1997 and 1998,
before it implemented an Exile program
(Richmond’s violent crime rate dropped by
19 percent during the same period).74 Given
the dearth of detailed research in the area,
and the lack of a scholarly consensus on the
causes of the nationwide decline in violent
crime, a bit of humility about Project Exile’s
claims is in order. 
Nonetheless, it stands to reason that if
prosecutors make an aggressive effort to
incarcerate armed felons—and if they focus
on defendants who are likely to be a future
threat to society—such prosecutions can have
an effect on the crime rate by getting a cer-
tain number of potential repeat offenders off
the streets. But if a more aggressive crime
control effort would bring substantial bene-
fits, there is absolutely no reason that it can-
not be undertaken by state law enforcement
personnel. As the court in United States v. Jones
put it, “While vigorous prosecution of
firearms offenses has undoubtedly con-
tributed to some unascertainable decline in
the city’s murder rate, there is no compelling
reason to suspect that a comparable effort by
local prosecutors would not achieve a com-
parable effect.”75
Indeed, state legislatures are, all other
things being equal, more responsive to local
concerns than is the federal government. More
important, state prosecutors are, for good or
ill, generally more responsive to local pressure
than are their federal counterparts. In most
states, prosecutors are elected, whereas U.S.
attorneys are presidential appointees. Thus,
the states are likely to have greater incentive
than the federal government to provide the
level of protection that their citizens demand. 
Even if Project Exile had the dramatic
impact on crime that its most ardent support-
ers argue it does, its affront to the
Constitution and the rule of law would com-
pel constitutionalists to oppose it. But the
available evidence suggests that its impact has
been far more modest. Thus, the supporters of
Project Exile and Project Safe Neighborhoods
have failed to produce any compelling reason
why systematic federal intervention is neces-
sary. Given the costs federalization brings, that
is a failure that should end the debate. 
Federalism’s Fair-Weather
Friends
In the course of defending Project Exile,
NRA executive director Wayne LaPierre Jr.
attacked federal judges who have criticized the
program: “They consider these nuisance cases,
and the last thing federal judges want are
armed felony cases in their courts. . . . That’s
shameful. Killing people is wrong, and . . . it
needs to be changed. Every cop on the street
knows it.”76 While everyone can agree with
LaPierre that “killing people is wrong,” that
obvious moral principle does not quite settle
the debate over the federalization of crime.
Something more is needed: a constitutional
justification for nationalizing matters that
have always been viewed as essentially local in
nature. But no such justification has been
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forthcoming; NRA officials such as LaPierre
and Charlton Heston repeatedly assailed
President Bill Clinton for failing to enforce
federal firearms statutes, without ever explain-
ing why such cases should be in federal court.
The supporters of federalizing gun crime lack
even a compelling policy rationale—let alone
constitutional grounds—for ignoring the dis-
tinction between local and interstate matters.
It is fairly clear that for supporters of the
Second Amendment the main justification for
federalizing gun crimes is political. Advocates
of gun rights such as the NRA got behind the
idea of nationalizing Project Exile because
they made the judgment that a call to “enforce
the gun laws on the books” could help ward
off further gun control legislation. But even as
a matter of political calculation, that may have
been ill-considered. The strength of the gun
control movement has been overestimated.
For example, Al Gore’s tough stance on guns
was likely a net liability for him in the 2000
presidential election, costing him states such
as West Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas. Al
From of the centrist Democratic Leadership
Council notes that 48 percent of voters in the
2000 election had guns in their households
and many feared Democratic gun control pro-
posals.77 As Gore’s running mate, Sen. Joe
Lieberman (D-Conn.), described the ticket’s
experience with the gun issue, “We lost a num-
ber of voters who on almost every other issue
realized they’d be better off with Al Gore.”78
And after September 11 support for gun con-
trol has eroded still further, according to a
Gallup poll taken a month after the attacks.79
“Any gun-control legislation of any kind is a
non-starter now,” says University of Virginia
political scientist Larry Sabato.80 Thus, the
NRA’s support for federalization initiatives
seems to be a case where political strategy has
outlived the conditions that gave rise to it.
The “respect for federalism” President
Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft publicly
profess ought to find expression in their offi-
cial conduct. There are disturbing indications,
however, that it will not. As has been widely
reported, where the administration disagrees
with policies pursued by particular states,
such as the legalization of assisted suicide and
the use of medicinal marijuana, it has used the
power of the federal government to intervene
forcefully.81 Project Safe Neighborhoods is of a
piece with those actions, and no one who truly
respects the Tenth Amendment and the doc-
trine of enumerated powers can support such
an ill-conceived program. 
Conclusion
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks, some commentators have suggested
that the constitutional principle of federal-
ism is a luxury we can no longer afford.82 But
precisely the opposite is the case. The consti-
tutional distinction between what is properly
local and what is properly national has never
been more important.83 Combating the
international threat of terrorism is a job for
which the Constitution provides the federal
government ample authority, in the form of
the power to declare war and to punish
offenses against the laws of nations.84
Prosecuting firearms offenses is a local issue,
one that the Constitution properly leaves to
states and localities. It is unwise to squander
federal resources in the pursuit of offenders
that the states and localities are perfectly
equipped to handle. Even more important,
we cannot afford to squander our constitu-
tional heritage of limited government.
Project Safe Neighborhoods violates the
constitutional principle of federalism. It also
threatens to lead to overenforcement of gun
laws and serious miscarriages of justice. If
President Bush has the respect for federalism
he professes, and if he takes seriously his oath
to uphold the Constitution, he must drop
Project Safe Neighborhoods. 
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